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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
V. STATE: A SPOUSE SUFFERING FROM
PORTER
BATTERED SPOUSE SYNDROME DOES NOT HAVE TO
EXPERIENCE ABUSE WITHIN MINUTES OF HIS OR HER
DEFENSIVE ACTION TO BE ENTITLED TO AN IMPERFECT
SELF-DEFENSE JURY INSTRUCTION; A CLAIM OF
IMPERFECT SELF-DEFENSE IS NOT FORFEITED WHEN
THE SPOUSE CONTRACTS A THIRD PARTY TO TAKE
DEFENSIVE ACTION.
By: Tyler Marie Duckett
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that, pursuant to Maryland's
battered spouse syndrome statute, a defendant who kills in a nonconfrontational setting is entitled to a jury instruction on imperfect selfdefense. Porter v. State, 455 Md. 220, 247-49, 166 A.3d 1044, 1060-61
(2017). This instruction does not require a spouse suffering from battered
spouse syndrome to have experienced abuse within minutes or hours of his
or her defensive action. Id. at 249, 166 A.3d at 1061. The court further held
that a battered spouse who contracts a third party does not forfeit a claim to
an imperfect self-defense instruction. Id. at 251, 166 A.3d at 1061-62.
In early 2010 in Baltimore County, Karla Louise Porter ("Porter")
contracted with Walter Bishop ("Bishop") to kill her husband Ray Porter
("Ray") in exchange for $400. Ray was shot and killed by Bishop after
Porter sent him to fix the alarm at their gas station. A week later Porter was
charged with first degree murder, three counts of solicitation to commit first
degree murder, and other related crimes.
During the trial, Porter testified to several instances of verbal and physical
abuse over the course of their relationship, including being beaten with
various objects. Additionally, Porter stated that in the year preceding Ray's
death, she was terrified on a daily basis. Porter also presented witnesses
corroborating her claims of abuse and called two experts to establish that she
suffered from battered spouse syndrome. At the conclusion of the trial, the
court read the State's proposed jury instruction on imperfect self-defense.
Those instructions required that Porter had used no more force than
reasonably necessary to defend herself, that retreat from Ray had been
unsafe, and that she had not been the aggressor. The jury subsequently found
Porter guilty on all counts.
Porter filed a motion for a new trial alleging that the jury was
inadequately instructed on how to evaluate evidence of battered spouse
syndrome in the context of imperfect self-defense. The motion was denied,
and Porter appealed. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed,
holding that Porter had not presented sufficient evidence to be entitled to an
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imperfect self-defense jury instruction. Therefore, any error in delivering the
instruction was harmless.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari. Porter, 455 Md. at
233, 166 A.3d at 1052. The court was asked to analyze the relationship
between the elements of imperfect self-defense and the battered spouse
syndrome statute. Id. at 234, 166 A.3d at 1052. Specifically, the court
focused on whether Porter was entitled to a jury instruction on imperfect
self-defense and if the trial court's erroneous jury instruction was harmless.
Id. at 239-40, 166 A.3d at 1055-56.
The court began by assessing the legal structure of self-defense in
Maryland. Porter, 455 Md. at 234-35, 166 A.3d at 1053. While perfect selfdefense requires the defendant to have had a reasonable belief that they were
in imminent danger, imperfect self-defense only requires an actual,
subjective belief that they were in danger. Id. at 235, 166 A.3d at 1053. The
defendant must produce some evidence on the issue of mitigation or selfdefense. Id. at 240, 166 A.3d at 1056 (citing Wilson v. State, 422 Md. 533,
541, 30 A.3d 955 (2011)). Once the evidence has been presented, a
defendant is entitled to a jury instruction explaining the elements of perfect
or imperfect self-defense. Porter, 455 Md. at 240, 166 A.3d at 1056.
In order to determine whether Porter was entitled to an instruction on
imperfect self-defense under the doctrine, the court analyzed the meaning of
imminent or immediate. Porter, 455 Md. at 240, 166 A.3d at 1056.
Specifically, the court reviewed the rationale for limiting self-defense to
threats of imminent or immediate danger. Id. at 248, 166 A.3d at 1061.
Self-defense is often limited to only these threats because a non-imminent
threat may never come to fruition and because there are other ways to
address a non-imminent threat besides responding with defensive force. Id. at
248, 166 A.3d at 1061 (citing Kit Kinports, The Myth of Battered Woman
Syndrome, 24 Temp. Pol. & C.R. L. Rev. 313, 315 (2015)). However,
experts testified that in a cyclical, abusive relationship, the threatened
violence will eventually come to fruition, but the syndrome prevents the
battered spouse from pursuing other options. Porter, 455 Md. at 247, 166
A.3d at 1060. Therefore, the court found these rationales were not
undermined by a claim of self-defense when a battered spouse kills in a nonconfrontational situation. Id. at 248, 166 A.3d at 1061.
The court next addressed the distinction between imminent and
immediate. Porter, 455 Md. at 241, 166 A.3d at 1056. Porter argued that the
imminent or immediate requirement was satisfied because she presented
evidence that the threat of violence was always present. Id. The court found
that the elements of imperfect self-defense required Porter to show that she
actually feared either imminent danger or immediate danger and that it was
unnecessary to prove both. Id. at 245, 166 A.3d at 1059. Further, the court
noted that an imminent threat is not dependent on its proximity to the
defensive act. Id. Rather, an imminent threat is one that places the
defendant in immediate fear for their life. Id. This distinction aligns with
the General Assembly's intent behind the battered spouse syndrome statute,
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which allows testimony explaining how a spouse might fear imminent
danger during a break between violent episodes. Id. at 245-46, 166 A.3d at
1059. Therefore, since Porter feared imminent danger, she was entitled to an
instruction on imperfect self-defense. Id. at 249, 166 A.3d at 1061.
Next, the court addressed whether a person who contracts a third party to
kill their abuser forfeits their right to an imperfect self-defense instruction.
Porter, 455 Md. at 250, 166 A.3d at 1061-62. The court noted that imperfect
self-defense negates the element of malice, but not premeditation. Id. A
spouse claiming imperfect self-defense must show that he or she feared
imminent or immediate danger; they do not have to prove that they acted
spontaneously. Id. at 250, 166 A.3d at 1061-62. Thus, the means by which a
spouse takes defensive action against an abuser does not impact whether he
or she actually believed that they were in imminent danger at the time of the
killing. Id. Therefore, Porter contracting a third party did not forfeit an
imperfect self-defense instruction. Id.
Ultimately, the court held that Porter had met her burden of establishing
that she was entitled to an imperfect self-defense instruction. Porter, 455
Md. at 252-53, 166 A.3d at 1063. Further, Porter demonstrated that the jury
had considered the self-defense claim since it requested more information
relating to battered spouse syndrome during deliberation. Id. Therefore, the
erroneous instruction was not harmless. Id. at 253, 166 A.3d at 1063-64.
The court thus vacated all of Porter's convictions and remanded the case. Id.
at 255, 166 A.3d at 1065.
The dissenting opinion alleged that the majority's definition of imminent
or immediate was too broad. Porter, 455 Md. at 259, 166 A.3d at 1067. The
dissenting judges argued that the majority's holding allows evidence
regarding battered spouse syndrome to be used unlimitedly. Id. They were
concerned with how broadly this interpretation can be applied. Id. Further,
they opposed the majority's holding on contract killings, alleging that under
stare decisis it erroneously contradicts jurisprudence, which typically bars
self-defense jury instructions in such cases. Id. at 263, 166 A.3d at 1069.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland concluded that a battered spouse is
entitled to an imperfect self-defense jury instruction, if he or she presents
some evidence that they feared imminent or immediate harm at the time of
the killing. Additionally, the court held that a battered spouse does not forfeit
this right if they contract a third party. This holding signals a progressive
shift in domestic violence jurisprudence, by allowing a jury to consider
evidence explaining a battered spouse's thoughts and decisions in taking
action against his or her abuser. This will ensure that battered spouses are
afforded fair trials by allowing juries to be presented with relevant evidence
when considering the elements of self-defense in this context.

